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A B S T R A C T
We investigate the implications of an integrated vis-à-vis a national perspective regarding investment in natural
gas infrastructure. In particular, we analyze cross-border spillovers related to the investment expenditure of ﬁve
Western European countries. We develop a practical approach to estimate such cross-border investment
expenditure spillovers using a multi-regional input-output model. We ﬁnd that international spillovers are
generally larger for employment compensation compared to capital compensation and that the spillovers are
unevenly distributed among the countries and the types of labor. Both high-skilled and medium-skilled labor is
impacted most in the country where the investments take place, whereas low-skilled labor is mostly generated
outside the EU. We argue that an integrated European gas infrastructure investment policy is to be
recommended.
1. Introduction
European Union (EU) energy market projections show large varia-
tions in future gas ﬂows, some even predict a decline in the total ﬂow,
but most models expect signiﬁcant local demand growth (Smith, 2013).
To facilitate these ﬂows additional transport and storage facilities are
required. One of the bottlenecks in the current infrastructure is the lack
of interconnectivity between European countries. The European
Commission actively pursues an integrated energy market (European
Commission, 2015). Individual countries try to beneﬁt by assigning
priority to their national gas sector for which they deﬁne domestic
infrastructural strategies. Moreover, these investments are generally
assessed at the national level only. The economic impact in other
countries is usually included in the national investment analysis as
negative leakage (Eijgenraam et al., 2000). As a result, the international
spillovers tend to be ignored. Especially since the turmoil in the
Ukraine, politicians in Europe come to realize that their dependency
on gas has a geopolitical dimension and that collaboration within the
EU might be helpful (Cobanli, 2014; Richter and Holz, 2015). This
warrants attention for the international eﬀects of gas infrastructure
investments in the EU. We try to contribute to the assessment of energy
infrastructure investments by developing a practical method for
estimating cross-border spillovers of these investments.
Gas transmission investment expenditures may entail large cross-
border indirect eﬀects. At a European level, these eﬀects do not have an
impact in case of a perfect market from the perspective of an overall
cost-beneﬁt analysis. However, the European labor and ﬁnancial
markets are subject to several frictions and imperfections. This
suggests that the indirect cross-border eﬀects need to be accounted
for. In addition, investments do have distributional eﬀects, both in
geographical terms and across labor and capital. These eﬀects need to
be considered from an economic perspective. So far, such analysis is
missing in the cost-beneﬁt analysis that concentrates on the cross-
border impacts after the project's implementation. We develop a
practical approach to estimate these spillovers and investigate the
indirect cross-border impact of investment expenditures related to gas
transmission infrastructure. We use a multi-regional input-output
(MRIO) model that tracks the impacts along the respective interna-
tional value chains. This allows for reporting on the size and distribu-
tion of the cross-border spillovers by country (and sector) of impact. As
such, we trace investment expenditures along the respective value
chains of the sectors supplying the investment goods, where we
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distinguish between domestic impacts, impacts in other EU countries,
and non-EU impacts. We analyze cross-border spillovers that are
estimated based on the investment plans of Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany and The Netherlands as published in the Ten Year Network
Development Plan (TYNDP) of the European Network of Transmission
System Operators of Gas (ENTSOG, 2013).1 In general, we expect the
cross-border spillovers to other EU countries to be a minor part of the
total impact of gas infrastructure investments. However, especially for
small countries, the cross-border impacts are expected to be larger due
to their higher degree of international openness. We are also interested
in the distribution of the impact. Any cross-border impacts are most
likely to occur in the largest trading partners of the countries.
Knowledge on the size and distribution of the cross-border spillovers
may aid the discussion of who should contribute to ﬁnancing the
investment, especially when it is a project of EU-wide importance.
Therefore, we investigate the regional impact of gas infrastructure
investments, instead of taking a national perspective and develop a
practical approach to estimate the cross-border spillovers. We argue
that there is a case to adjust the evidence base for investment decision-
making to include cross-border stimulus as a perceived beneﬁt, instead
of viewing it as a leakage. We ﬁnd substantial diﬀerences between
countries regarding the impact of gas infrastructure investment on
domestic value added and the cross-border leakages to other countries.
The distribution of the intra-EU cross-border spillovers appears to be
concentrated in only a few countries. We also ﬁnd that the impacts on
employment by skill levels are not evenly distributed for medium-
skilled labor.
In the next section, we ﬁrst give background information about
large-scale EU gas infrastructure investment plans, before we turn to a
description of our method, data and results.
2. EU gas market integration
Energy policy is listed high on the political agenda. For example, the
Energy Union has been marked as a priority by the European
Commission (2015). It focuses on creating an integrated internal
energy market and on ensuring the security of energy supply.
Working towards either objective requires adjustments of the institu-
tional framework (regulation, policies) and technical alterations (such
as investment in additional pipelines and interconnectors and storage
to increase both capacity and ﬂexibility). In this respect, the gas sector
sees the EU-wide unbundling of utility companies into trading com-
panies and transmission system operators (TSOs). Competition among
the trading companies is facilitated by rules that aim to create a well-
functioning internal market for gas. In contrast, the gas transmission
operators were continued as state-owned enterprises under stringent
regulation, next to European wide institutions like the Agency for the
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) and ENTSOG.
Investing in infrastructure is a means to increase the security of
supply and to enhance competition. Low security of supply is in most
cases due to a large dependence on one source and limited connectivity
(see Le Coq and Paltseva, 2009). To address security of energy supply,
the EU calls for more diversiﬁcation in gas sources and transmission
pipelines and for an increase in interconnection capacity as borders
turn out to be bottlenecks (Gasmi and Oviedo, 2010; European
Commission, 2012a).
Projections of gas demand show increasing gas ﬂows in about half of
the scenarios included in a study by Smith (2013). He ﬁnds that the
diﬀerence between declining or rising demand hinges mostly on
assumptions related to displacement rates. This can be the rate at which
fossil fuels will be displaced by renewables and/or nuclear generation, or
the rate at which gas will displace other fossil fuels as a (transitory) fuel
for electricity generation. Other arguments that point at a potential
increase in the demand for gas are the somewhat lower carbon content of
gas compared to other fossil fuels and its higher production ﬂexibility in
electric power generation. Regarding the supply side, European domestic
production is expected to decrease due to dwindling reserves. Then,
higher demand coupled with decreasing domestic production will result
in a substantial increase in import ﬂows. Consequently, the transmission
of these gas ﬂows from outside the EU to the diﬀerent nations will
require additional investments. Further, even when aggregate EU gas
demand growth is projected as moderate, the diﬀerences across nations
can be signiﬁcant. Adequate transmission capacity and ﬂexibility to
speciﬁc nations and regions will need to be ensured (Smith, 2013).
Transmission investment decisions are made by the TSOs. The risk
related to gas infrastructure investments mainly lies in uncertainty
about demand for future transport services. The European Union has
set up a ﬁnancial facility to support targeted infrastructure investment
(European Commission, 2011). Of the total budget of € 50 billion for
2014–2020, € 9.1 billion is reserved for energy infrastructure invest-
ment. It is estimated that € 2.9 billion will be required to leverage gas
infrastructure investments, of which investments will fall short by an
estimated amount of € 16 billion. The amount needed to leverage gas
infrastructure investments is estimated to be € 100 million for the
West Europe corridor and € 1 billion for the Central Europe corridor
(European Commission, 2012b). An objective and transparent assess-
ment of each investment plan is required in order to ensure that social
welfare is maximized. We argue it is crucial that this assessment is
done from an EU-wide viewpoint, to properly account for cross-border
eﬀects and to ensure system-wide optimality, both in the short terms
and in the long term.
ENTSOG compiles the TYNDPs and the 2013–2022 TYNDP lists
projects for a total value of 72.77 billion euro (ENTSOG, 2013).2 The
largest share (83%) of the costs of investment plans relates to
transmission projects, where the remaining 17% consists of storage
and LNG projects. In terms of cost shares, for 87% of the projected
costs the ﬁnal investment decision has not yet been taken. Next to the
biannual EU TYNDP, TSOs also have to publish Gas Regional
Investment Plans, which promote further regional cooperation. We
will use the information from these investment plans to arrive at cost
estimates, which are then allocated to the sectors serving the invest-
ment demand. Investment plans also needs to be assessed regarding
the optimal conﬁguration of the network. This especially holds for
projects of common interest. Currently, the developments at the EU
level are at a stage where a framework is devised to assess investment
plans in light of one integrated EU gas infrastructure. ENTSOG has
developed the methodology to assess the impact of cross-border gas
infrastructure investments (ENTSOG, 2015).3 This methodology in-
cludes an assessment of cross-border impacts by analyzing the change
in social welfare induced by a project in each impacted country. This
change is captured by the change in the supply curve due to better
access to a cheaper source (ENTSOG, 2015, p.29). However, this
approach only focuses on the economic impacts of the project after
implementation. We argue that a complete cost-beneﬁt analysis should
also include the cross-border impacts at the stage of implementation,
i.e., the cross-border impacts of the investment expenditure.
3. Methodology and data
Investing in large-scale infrastructure projects creates international
spillovers. A nationally focused assessment of the impacts usually
1 ENTSOG TYNDP 2013–2022; http://www.entsog.eu/publications/tyndp/
2013#ENTSOG-TEN-YEAR-NETWORK-DEVELOPMENT-PLAN-2013–2022.
2 See Table 2.6 of the Main Report. Not all projects have made cost estimates available
to ENTSOG, hence the total cost estimate covers only 35% of all projects. It is explicitly
noted that this ratio cannot be extrapolated to calculate the total cost estimate for all
projects.
3 See for the documentation of the full process http://www.entsog.eu/publications/
cba-methodology#CBA-METHODOLOGIES.
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includes an estimation of the total amount of investment expenditure
that leaks away from the country. This estimate is recorded as a
negative eﬀect, without further assessing where the money ﬂows to
(e.g., which country, sector, and production factor). Previous literature
focuses on optimal network conﬁguration in direct relation to the
functioning of the network and disregards the impact of the investment
itself on the wider economy. For example, Bergendahl (1988) investi-
gates whether gas capacity expansion into new regions is proﬁtable
from a social point of view. He ﬁrst determines the optimal size of the
investment based on demand at diﬀerent locations along the pipeline,
and then investigates whether the return is acceptable. De Nooij et al.
(2010) devise a cost-beneﬁt framework which allows them to establish
that the costs of taking care that networks are always able to maintain
supply most likely outweigh the beneﬁts if it would need to be upheld
during periods of maintenance. Neuhoﬀ et al. (2008) use linear
programming to select investment options regarding electricity gen-
eration by optimizing system dispatch given assumptions on security
requirements, fuel and other costs including environmental costs, and
transmission possibilities. Their results highlight the crucial role of
transmission constraints. The approach of Spiecker et al. (2013) allows
the assessment of interconnector investments given the presence of
intermittency and endogenous power plant investments. Baltensperger
et al. (2015) simulate the impact of infrastructure expansions on social
welfare and security of gas supply. Huppmann and Egerer (2015)
investigate the impact of zonal planners deciding on electricity trans-
port network investment and focus on the consequences for interna-
tional welfare arising from power network upgrading. Üster and
Dilaveroğlu (2014) and Midthun et al. (2015) try to optimize the
design and operation of national gas transmission networks. Neuhoﬀ
et al. (2015) speciﬁcally investigate the design of international power
transmission capacity in relation to the integration of renewable energy
sources. Lehmann et al. (2015) reﬂect on the role of capacity payment
to secure the supply of electricity in this respect. Mulder and Scholtens
(2016) provide a plant-level analysis of international spill-over eﬀects
from electricity generation. We contribute to this literature by present-
ing a method that accounts for analyzing the size and distribution of
the cross-border impacts associated with investment expenditure for
gas infrastructure; we do not account for market structure and
uncertainty.
In this paper, we focus speciﬁcally on the international linkages (see
also Baltensperger et al., 2015; Huppman and Egerer, 2015; Neuhoﬀ
et al., 2015). We argue that from the EU perspective, ﬂows to other EU
countries should not be regarded as negative eﬀects. Hence, we expand
the scope of the investment analysis and estimate investment expen-
diture related to the investment projects presented in the TYNDP and
systematically assess the impacts of these diﬀerent investment plans on
each European economy via a multi-regional input-output model.
3.1. International input-output modeling
Our main research interest is to establish the cross-border indirect
eﬀects of an investment stimulus, in terms of economic impacts in
other countries than the country where the initial economic stimulus
takes place. We use a multi-regional input-output (MRIO) model
(Miller and Blair, 2009) to estimate the cross-border spillovers. This
methodology has also been used to estimate trade in value added and
represent global value chains (e.g., Johnson and Noguera, 2012;
OECD, 2013; Koopman et al., 2014; Timmer et al., 2014). Miller and
Blair (2009) argue it is the most appropriate framework to assess cross-
border direct and indirect impacts of spending. These impacts can
range from value added impacts to environmental impacts. The
underlying data, represented in an MRIO table shows all connections
between industries in terms of intermediate deliveries. Consumption
by households, the government and capital formation (investment)
enter the model exogenously. The direct and indirect additional
production required to produce the exogenous ﬁnal demand can be
calculated by summing over all additional intermediate products
required. The advantage of the model is its inclusive scope and its
detail; the complete economy is represented in an integrated network
of industries. Analyzing eﬀects of ﬁnal demand shocks provides a full
picture of the economy wide eﬀects.
In our paper, the vectors representing demand packages for
infrastructural expenditures are used as demand shocks in MRIO
modeling. The impacts in terms of value added generated can be
traced to the respective countries that contribute at some stage,
possibly only indirectly, to the production process of the investment
goods. The input-output identity is mathematically represented as
follows, where bold capital letters represent matrices and bold small-
cap letters denote column vectors:
x Ax f= + . (1)
Matrix A shows all intermediate purchases by buying industry j and
selling industry i as share in total inputs of the buying industry. Along
the columns and rows, the same set of industries is listed, where along
a column, all purchases of an industry over one year are recorded, and
in a row, all sales of an industry over one year are recorded. Vector x
contains the values of output per industry and vector f represents the
vector of exogenous ﬁnal demand. Solving Eq. (1) for x gives the input-
output model:
x I A f= ( − ) ,−1 (2)
where I is the identity matrix of the same size as A. The solution is also
often represented as x Lf= . An element of the matrix L denoted with
the indices i I= 1⋯ and j J= 1⋯ shows the direct and indirect
additional output of industry i required to produce one more ﬁnal
product j. More information on the model, its background, mathema-
tical properties and underlying assumptions can be found in Miller and
Blair (2009). This fundamental model can be used to represent one
country, but it can also incorporate many countries. In case multiple
countries are distinguished two more indices are added: r R= 1⋯ to
represent the country of origin and s S= 1⋯ to represent the country of
destination. In this vectors x and f have R I* elements and L is of
dimensions R I* by S J* . In this paper, we use information on invest-
ments to specify a vector c, which represents the expenditure on goods
and services following an investment plan for gas infrastructure. The
role of this vector is analogous to vector f , but we use c to distinguish it
from total ﬁnal demand by all categories, which also includes demand
by households, government and change in inventories.
To focus on more standard measures of economic activity than
gross output, we calculate the impact in terms of value added and
employment eﬀects. First, for the value added eﬀects, we use a vector w
that represents the value added in terms of value added by labor per
unit of output, and vector v that represents value added by capital per
unit of output. Our results are calculated as follows. Value added by
labor is given by:
w w Lc= ′ , (3)
and value added by capital is calculated by:
v v Lc= ′ , (4)
where the symbol “′” denotes the transposition of the vector noted
before the symbol. In our analysis we use an international input-output
model, which allows us to break down the results on value added
generated to identify the country where the ﬁnal demand is generated.
Second, we look at employment. We use a vector denoted by e to
represent the employment in hours per unit of production. Analogous
to Eqs. (3) and (4) we calculate the result as follows:
e e Lc= ′ . (5)




The international input-output data used for this study is from
EXIOBASE (see Tukker et al., 2009; Tukker et al., 2013).4 This
database was ﬁrst developed for the EXIOPOL project, which had as
full name: ‘A new environmental accounting framework using extern-
ality data and input-output tools for policy analysis’. For this study,
version 2 of the database has been used, which provides input-output
relations for the year 2007. These are captured in an MRIO table that
represents 43 individual countries and ﬁve aggregate regions repre-
senting the ‘rest of the world’ (RoW). The individual countries are the
27 Member States of the European Union5 and 16 other large
economies. For each of these countries and the RoW regions inter-
mediate and ﬁnal demand transactions inside the national borders as
well as across national borders are represented. The use of primary
factors by each industry in each country is also registered in value
terms (i.e., value added by each industry). A distinction is made
between value added by compensation of employees and operating
surplus (consumption of ﬁxed capital, rents and remaining net operat-
ing surplus).
The value of this database over other MRIO databases is its detailed
industry representation. In total 163 industries are represented for
each country, making this database more suitable to trace the eﬀects of
expenditure on speciﬁc goods and services. Currently, data is available
for only two reference years: 2000 and 2007. The 2007 data used in the
present study reﬂects the economic situation of a few years prior to the
start of the TYNDP plans investigated. However, this study only makes
use of input shares and the resulting information on linkages between
industries and not the absolute values present in the database.
Generally, these input coeﬃcients are taken to be rather stable over
longer periods (Miller and Blair, 2009). In addition to the monetary
representation of primary inputs, the use of employment in hours by
skill category is also available. The skill categories that are distin-
guished are: high-skilled, medium-skilled and low-skilled. The quantity
data on primary factors is not an integral part of the input-output table,
which only contains ﬂows in value terms. They are part of extensive
satellite accounts that also contain information on a host of envir-
onmentally relevant data.
3.2.2. Investment
The investment demand estimates are combined with the MRIO
model to trace out the distribution of the impacts over countries. Value
added coeﬃcients and employment coeﬃcients are used to translate
the impacts into employment compensation, capital compensation and
employment hours required. The multi-regional input-output model is
calibrated with data from EXIOBASE. To connect the investment
expenditure to an input-output model, the expenditure on the ﬁnal
investment goods bought needs to be deﬁned. Our paper showcases the
strengths of an impact study performed with a multi-regional input-
output modeling. When used to calculate the indirect eﬀects of an
investment project, all relevant investment expenses will be known in
detail. In case several detailed investment scenarios need to be
compared, as in a social cost-beneﬁt analysis, care must be taken to
work with detailed expenditure estimates. Our aim is to show what type
of information can be derived from undertaking this exercise.
For this purpose, a set of projects across ﬁve Western European
countries has been translated into expenditure estimates, namely
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and The Netherlands. Austria,
Belgium and Germany have an extensive entry and exit capacity, which
indicates an important role as international transit country. The
Netherlands is primarily an exporting country with relatively high exit
capacity, whereas France predominantly is to be regarded as an
importing country given its larger entry capacity. All ﬁve countries
are to be considered important nodes in Western Europe's gas network.
The investment expenditure estimates based on information in the
TYNDP is reported in Table 1. The investment plans of the larger
countries, France and Germany, are more extensive in terms of
absolute values. However, in relation to the overall size of the economy,
France plans to invest most and The Netherlands plans to invest more
than Germany. The type of investment varies much over the countries.
Austria and Germany focus largely on transport investment. The
coastal countries invest more in LNG, with the exception of
Germany. The larger countries invest in underground storage. Only
The Netherlands is somewhat of an outlier, with a large focus on
additional compression power and investment in underground storage.
These estimates are in line with the estimates of the EU of the
amount of investments required in the Western European corridor,
which are estimated at 20 billion euros (European Commission, 2012c,
p.8). Austria is part of the Central European corridor, where the total
investment need is estimated to be 26 billion Euros. These approximate
ﬁgures are from calculations made by the European Commission's DG
ENER based on data from the model PRIMES. PRIMES is a partial
equilibrium model for the European Union energy markets, used for
forecasting, scenario construction and policy impact analysis up to the
year 2030 (European Commission, 2012b).
The various sets of investment projects for each country need to be
translated into expenditure on ﬁnal goods and services that can be
linked to the MRIO table. For this purpose, allocation percentages have
been estimated that can distribute the investment expenditures by
project type over the industries that deliver the required goods and
services. These shares are derived from information taken from the
literature (Rui et al., 2012; Harris et al., 2010; Oil and Gas Journal
Data Book, 2008) of which the details can be found in the
Supplementary material. The percentages point at the share of invest-
ment expenditure spent in the sector indicated. Investing in pipelines
mainly implies a need for construction eﬀort and materials.
Compression and LNG investment requires more machinery and
equipment. The allocation percentages used are provided in Table 2.
The ﬁnal investment demand packages are shown in Table 3. These
are derived by multiplying the estimated investment expenditure (see
Table 1) by the percentages indicating in which sector this investment
is spent, for each type of investment (see Table 2). The input-output
data also contains information about the international distribution of
total investment demand. That information is used in terms of shares
to distribute the ﬁnal investment demand packages of Table 3 over
diﬀerent source countries. For example, it is assumed that the
investment expenditure in machinery and equipment for gas infra-
structure projects by country A is distributed over the supplying
countries with the same percentages as the distribution of countries
A's general investment, say 50% in country A, 30% in country B and
20% in country C. The distributed investment packages represent the
direct impact of investment expenditure on output in the listed sectors
in all countries that supply these ﬁnal investment goods and services.
By means of input-output modeling, these direct impacts can be traced
back to the value added impacts, through the full chain of intermediate
supply relations and including the indirect impacts. In the
Supplementary material to this paper, we explain in more detail how
the investment expenditure has been estimated.
4. Results and discussion
Our aim is to provide insight in the economic impact of gas
infrastructure investment expenditures. The less alike two industries
in their intermediate input pattern, in terms of industries delivering or
countries exporting the inputs, the larger will be the diﬀerence in the
outcomes. The ﬁve countries studied represent important nodes in
Western Europe's gas infrastructures. The cross-border impacts of
4 The data is publicly available via http://exiobase.eu
5 Croatia is not included in EXIOBASE 2 (year 2007).
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their investment expenditure portfolios should be considered when
deciding on EU support for infrastructural projects.
To compare their magnitude and to contrast the geographical
distribution of the impacts, we will speciﬁcally focus on percentages
in our analysis and not on absolute numbers. The impact on value
added and employment is calculated for the investment stimulus by
each country separately. For example, the cross-border spillovers of
Germany are the cross-border spillovers from the implementation of
the investment package that has been identiﬁed for Germany. The
results for each country are independent from the impacts generated by
investment elsewhere.
4.1. Value added
We ﬁrst focus on the direct and indirect value added impacts
generated due to gas infrastructure expenditure. The speciﬁc economic
impacts we discuss are employment compensation and gross operating
surplus. Both constitute the main income categories of gross domestic
product (GDP). In national accounting, total ﬁnal demand (GDP from
the expenditure perspective) should exactly equal total value added
(GDP from the income perspective). The exogenous demand impulse is
fully propagated through the interindustry linkages to the sectors
where value added is created. This also holds for our investment
expenditure demand impulse. The total impact on value added
(including taxes less subsidies) is exactly equal to the investment
expenditure sum.
The MRIO model allows investigating how the investment expen-
diture is distributed over the countries and the sectors aﬀected, and the
type of value added generated. In our discussion, we focus on the
countries aﬀected and the type of value added generated. We ﬁrst
discuss the distribution of the economic impact over domestic impacts,
impacts in other EU countries, and impacts in non-EU countries. Next,
we look into more detail regarding the impacts in other EU countries to
specify which other countries beneﬁt most next to the country where
the investment takes place.
In Table 4 the distribution of the impact of gas infrastructure
investment over type of value added and geographic location is shown.
The total percentages of impact on employment compensation from
investment expenditure in the ﬁve countries are quite close, the range
being from 50% to 55%. The range for total impact on gross operating
surplus diverges somewhat more, with values from 36% to 44%. The
diﬀerence is due to small variations in the impact on taxes. For Austria,
Belgium, and Germany a smaller percentage (50–51%) ﬂows to
employment compensation, than for The Netherlands and France
(54–55%). The mirror images holds for gross operating surplus, by
deﬁnition. The combined eﬀect of the higher impact on employment
compensation from French investment expenditure and the higher
impact on taxes, implies that investment in France generates relatively
low gross operating surplus.
Comparing the size of the impact on domestic employment
compensation, the larger impacts are associated with the larger
countries, while the impacts generated abroad are relatively small for
these countries. This is as expected; it is common to ﬁnd that the larger
an economy is, the smaller its international linkages are. However, this
does not hold for the impacts on domestic gross operating surplus, as
the impact in France is just slightly higher than the lowest percentage
for The Netherlands. Germany and Austria capture most themselves in
terms of domestic gross operating surplus as result of investment
expenditure in these countries.
When looking at the cross-border impacts, The Netherlands and
Belgium are clearly more internationally oriented. This can be con-
Table 1
Investment in million euros by country and project type.
M€ Pipelines Compression LNG Underground storage Total Total as % of GDPa
Austria 578 (81%) 131 (19%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 710 0.4%
Belgium 159 (29%) 44 (8%) 352 (63%) 0 (0%) 555 0.3%
France 4751 (47%) 1200 (12%) 2615 (26%) 1550 (15%) 10,118 0.8%
Germany 6726 (76%) 1580 (18%) 0 (0%) 600 (7%) 8,906 0.5%
Netherlands 312 (13%) 854 (37%) 352 (15%) 800 (35%) 2,318 0.6%
The percentage between brackets is the share of the project type investment in total investment.
a GDP at basic prices (=total gross value added), source: EXIOBASE. Note that the GDP reference value pertains to one year, whereas these investment plans cover a 10-year period.
Table 2
Allocation percentages.
% Pipelines Compression LNGa Underground
storage†
i28 Fabricated metal 21% 35% 35% 25%
i29 Machinery &
equipment
8% 14% 14% 10%
i45 Construction 51% 31% 31% 30%
i60.2 Transport 6% 6% 6% 10%
i65 Financial services 3% 3% 3% 5%
i66 Insurance and
pension funding
3% 3% 3% 5%
i70 Real estate
activities
5% 1% 1% 1%
i74 Business services 4% 8% 8% 14%
Note: the first column refers to EXIOBASE industry codes.
a Due to lack of data on LNG investment, the percentages for compression power are
also used for LNG. † With minor adjustment adopted from Harris et al. (2010).
Table 3
Allocation of investments to sectors in million euros.
M€ AT BE FR DE NL Total Total %
i28 Fabricated metal 165 171 2,702 2,089 686 5,813 25.7%
i29 Machinery & equipment 66 68 1,081 836 274 2,325 10.3%
i45 Construction 333 202 4,041 4,067 768 9,412 41.6%
i60.2 Transport 42 32 655 547 168 1,444 6.4%
i65 Financial services 21 16 328 273 84 722 3.2%
i66 Insurance and pension funding 21 16 328 273 84 722 3.2%
i70 Real estate activities 28 10 262 335 28 664 2.9%
i74 Business services 34 38 721 486 224 1,503 6.6%
Total 710 555 10,118 8,906 2,318 22,606 100%
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cluded from the higher impacts in both other EU countries and in non-
EU countries, both for employment compensation and gross operating
surplus. Austria comes in third close behind these countries, where in
terms of other EU impact it is closer to the Netherlands and Belgium,
whereas for non-EU impacts it is closer to the larger countries
Germany and France. Although Austria is geographically nearer to
non-EU countries than Belgium and The Netherlands, the fact that it is
landlocked may explain this limited linkage to non-EU countries. Fig. 1
shows the same ﬁnding in an alternative representation; The
Netherlands is more open, both towards other EU countries and
non-EU countries than Germany or France. The share of non-EU
spillovers from gas infrastructure investments is not far apart for these
larger countries, but the share of domestic versus other EU linkages
shows that France is more integrated within the rest of the EU in this
respect than Germany is.
In Table 5 the impact in ‘other EU’ is presented in more detail. In
the columns, the countries are represented that invest in gas infra-
structure. In the rows the countries are listed where the largest value
added impacts occur. These countries represent at least 86% of the
impact in other EU countries. Germany turns out to be an important
supplier of products and services used as intermediate inputs by the
sectors to which investment expenditure is allocated for all ﬁve
investors. Of the employment compensation impacts generated in
other EU countries because of gas infrastructure investment in
Austria, 47% goes to Germany. The impacts generated in Germany
are smallest from the investments made in France, both for employ-
ment compensation (24%) and gross operating surplus (22%). Outside
the investor countries, Italy and the UK both beneﬁt relatively much
from investments elsewhere. German investment has the lowest total
percentages, so relatively much of their investment ﬂows to other EU
countries that are not represented in the table.
4.2. Employment
We now analyze the eﬀects in terms of hours of employment
generated, diﬀerentiated with respect to skill level. We discern the
Table 4
Distribution of value added generated due to gas infrastructure investment.
% Employment compensation Gross operating surplus Taxes
Domestic Other EU non-EU Σ Domestic Other EU Non-EU Σ Σ
Austria 33% 12% 4% 50% 30% 10% 5% 44% 6%
Belgium 29% 16% 6% 51% 24% 11% 7% 42% 7%
France 40% 11% 4% 55% 23% 8% 5% 36% 8%
Germany 39% 6% 5% 51% 32% 5% 6% 43% 6%
Netherlands 34% 13% 7% 54% 22% 10% 7% 39% 7%
Fig. 1. Domestic and cross-border shares of value added generated by gas infrastructure investment.6
Table 5
The impacts in other EU in more detail.
investor Austria Belgium France Germany Netherlands
Impact in: ec gos ec gos ec gos ec gos ec gos
Austria ― ― 2% 3% 2% 2% 8% 9% 2% 2%
Belgium 3% 3% ― ― 10% 11% 7% 7% 10% 10%
Czech Republic 3% 5% 2% 2% 1% 2% 6% 8% 2% 2%
France 6% 4% 17% 13% ― ― 14% 9% 10% 7%
Germany 47% 44% 29% 30% 24% 22% ― ― 35% 35%
Italy 14% 10% 12% 9% 17% 13% 18% 13% 9% 7%
Netherlands 3% 3% 12% 12% 11% 10% 6% 6% ― ―
Poland 2% 4% 2% 3% 1% 2% 5% 9% 2% 4%
Slovak Republic 2% 4% 0% 1% 0% 1% 2% 3% 0% 1%
Spain 2% 3% 4% 5% 8% 10% 5% 6% 4% 5%
Sweden 2% 2% 3% 3% 2% 2% 4% 4% 4% 4%
United Kingdom 6% 6% 12% 10% 17% 16% 13% 10% 14% 12%
Total 90% 88% 95% 92% 93% 91% 88% 86% 92% 89%
* ec=employment compensation, gos=gross operating surplus.
Values larger than 10% are in bold face. Values lower than 3.85% are in italic font. The value 3.85% is 100%/26, the percentage each country would be associated with in a completely
equal distribution over all 26 EU partner countries. Only countries with at least one value over 3.85% are represented here.
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impact on hours of employment of high-skilled labor, medium-skilled
labor, and low-skilled labor. The EXIOBASE data on diﬀerent types of
labor are in line with EU-KLEMS (http://www.euklems.net); high-
skilled equals a university degree, medium-skilled: higher professional
and vocational education (secondary level), lower-skilled: all up to
lower secondary education.
Table 6 shows that the investment generates mainly medium-
skilled job hours. Although the total impact on medium-skilled labor
is quite similar for the diﬀerent investors, there is clearly a diﬀerence in
where the impact occurs. France and Germany are very much
domestically focused. Belgium and the Netherlands have the highest
percentages of impact in non-EU countries. Centrally located Austria
has a relatively high other EU impact. Most strikingly is the opposite
patterns shown for low-skilled and high-skilled employment generated.
All investors generate relative much low-skilled labor in non-EU
countries compared to the domestic and other EU impacts, whereas
for high-skilled labor is primarily generated within the investing
country. Of Belgian investment, only 33% of the labor hours generated
is within the country itself. Of the cross-border impacts, 22% is in other
European countries, and 44% is in non-EU countries. The employment
impacts of The Netherlands are for 51% in non-EU countries, while
Austria and France generate 32% and 34% of the job hours in countries
outside the EU. As with the value added results, France and Germany
keep most of the employment impact within their own borders, 50%
and 49% respectively.
In Fig. 2, we depict the employment impacts by skill-level in
relation to the geographical destination for France, Germany and The
Netherlands. For all three countries, the distribution across skill-levels
is rather similar, especially for the non-EU impacts. Only a few
diﬀerences can be noted for the domestic and other EU impacts. In
Germany, the share of medium-skilled employment hours generated in
other EU countries is slightly higher than other countries at the
expense of high-skilled labor. The largest diﬀerence in terms of labor
composition is found for the domestic impacts. The Netherlands has
the highest share of high-skilled labor impact of the three countries,
whereas Dutch medium-skilled labor beneﬁts least from investment in
The Netherlands compared to the domestic impacts in the other two
countries.
In Table 7, the impact in other EU countries is shown in more
detail. The impacts in terms of employment hours are more diverse
than the value added results. Still, Germany beneﬁts relatively much
from gas infrastructure investment in each of the four other investor
countries as was the case for the value added impacts. Italy and the UK
are again relatively much impacted, but in terms of employment hours,
Czech Republic and Poland show sizeable impacts also. Austria creates
relatively much impact, around a third of its other EU impacts, in
Germany across all skill-levels. The reverse is not true; Germany has
not much impact on Austrian employment. Austria is clearly more
linked to various countries in Eastern Europe, whereas Germany's
impacts are mostly concentrated in the Czech Republic and Poland.
As we focused on the distribution of the impacts, a larger or smaller
value of investment expenditure will not change this distribution.
However, changes in the allocation percentages of the types of
expenditures to the sectors that supply the goods and services will
have an impact. Diﬀerent sectors have diﬀerent links to other indus-
tries and to other countries. If the contribution of a certain sector
increases or decreases compared to another sector, this will have an
impact on the distribution. As already pointed out at the beginning, the
less similar two industries are regarding their intermediate input
pattern, in terms of industries delivering or countries exporting the
inputs, the larger will be the diﬀerences regarding the impact.
5. Conclusions and policy recommendations
We estimate the cost-side impact of investments in gas transmis-
sion by quantifying the direct and indirect, national and international
impacts on the basis of a multi-regional input-output (MRIO) model.
First, we estimate the value of investment projects included in the Ten
Year Network Development Plans (TYNDP). The overall budgets for the
diﬀerent plans are translated into gross ﬁxed capital formation by the
industries that manufacture the pipelines, compressor station ele-
ments, storage facilities, and interconnectors. The demand stimulus
from investment is traced back through (inter)national value chains to
the impact on value added and employment in each of the countries
aﬀected. The relative importance of the ﬂows for the countries varies a
lot. In terms of additional employment, compensation and gross value
added the impacts show in general the same pattern, however, it is
quite clear that for smaller countries, the intra-EU impacts are
relatively large.
Our analysis strengthens the case for an EU-wide perspective of gas
infrastructure investments. Policy makers at the EU-level already focus
on developing an integrated international gas transmission network
(European Union, 2015). Within this network, main connection routes
may emerge. Given the large extension projects and the increased
density of the EU gas network, forces are at play that may result in a
shift in the supply and demand conditions that can be derived from
these gas ﬂows. Countries with large transit ﬂows may be better able to
ensure the security of supply. The same holds for countries with
diversiﬁed sources and multiple interconnectors. Several countries
have indicated they want to pursue a nodal function in this network.
However, investing in the creation of a gas hub in each country is sub-
optimal. Nevertheless, several national transmission operators focus on
a role as regional hub. It usually is strongly supported by national
governments in order to secure ﬁrst mover advantages, develop
comparative advantages, stimulate key sectors, and generate employ-
ment.
However, it is evident that several of the proposed large-scale
infrastructural projects are mutually exclusive. For example, if a strong
North-South connection is created in Germany connecting ﬂows from
Denmark to France, and alternative connection through The
Netherlands and Belgium will be redundant. The main policy recom-
mendation from our study is that an international, in our case
European Union wide, focus regarding gas infrastructure investments
is to be recommended: these investments need to be coordinated at
such international level. The current national focus might lead to
Table 6
Employment generated by skill-level, in million hours.
Low-skilled Medium-skilled High-skilled Total
Domestic other EU non-EU Σ Domestic other EU non-EU Σ Domestic other EU non-EU Σ (million hours)
Austria 5% 2% 13% 20% 26% 13% 15% 54% 14% 7% 4% 26% 26
Belgium 3% 2% 17% 22% 18% 13% 21% 52% 12% 8% 6% 26% 20
France 3% 1% 15% 20% 30% 9% 15% 54% 17% 6% 4% 26% 366
Germany 4% 1% 18% 23% 31% 7% 17% 55% 14% 4% 5% 22% 379
Netherlands 3% 2% 23% 27% 17% 9% 22% 49% 13% 6% 6% 24% 103
6 These percentages are derived from the same data underlying Table 4. Note that the
percentages in Fig. 1 also include taxes distributed over domestic, other EU and non-EU.
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wasteful overinvestment in case gas infrastructure developments in
other countries would remain being ignored. To establish which
countries would optimally be the important nodes in the European
network from a European Union perspective, we recommend a fully
internationally focused investment analysis should be undertaken.
In this study, we suggest a practical approach to account for the
cross-border eﬀect of gas infrastructure investments. The methodology
proposed by ENTSOG (see Section 2) only includes cross-border impacts
after the project's implementation. We particularly focus on one
component which is not yet included in this proposed methodology;
assessing the cross-border impacts of investment expenditure itself. In
this respect, our analysis contributes to a better understanding of the
impacts along the international value chain of the expenditure related to
alternative investment plans. Multi-regional input-output modeling can
play a role in the assessment methodology as it provides detailed sector-
level socio-economic impact estimates of the investments.
Fig. 2. Shares of employment hours by skill-level.
Table 7
Employment generated in other EU countries, by skill-level, in million hours.
investor Austria Belgium France Germany The Netherlands
impact in: l-s† m-s† h-s† l-s m-s h-s l-s m-s h-s l-s m-s h-s l-s m-s h-s
Austria ― ― ― 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 7% 4% 5% 2% 2% 2%
Belgium 2% 1% 2% ― ― ― 6% 6% 8% 4% 3% 4% 7% 6% 8%
Czech Rep. 8% 10% 9% 4% 5% 5% 3% 4% 3% 13% 15% 14% 5% 6% 5%
France 3% 3% 4% 9% 12% 15% ― ― ― 5% 6% 9% 5% 6% 8%
Germany 32% 28% 31% 23% 21% 21% 20% 18% 18% ― ― ― 27% 25% 25%
Hungary 3% 7% 4% 1% 2% 2% 1% 2% 1% 3% 6% 4% 1% 2% 1%
Italy 8% 11% 12% 8% 11% 12% 13% 18% 17% 9% 12% 14% 6% 9% 10%
Netherlands 2% 1% 2% 11% 8% 10% 6% 5% 10% 4% 3% 4% ― ― ―
Poland 9% 12% 7% 7% 10% 6% 6% 8% 4% 18% 22% 14% 9% 12% 7%
Romania 9% 6% 5% 3% 2% 1% 5% 4% 3% 7% 5% 3% 4% 3% 2%
Slovak Rep. 5% 5% 5% 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 3% 4% 3% 2% 2% 1%
Spain 2% 2% 2% 6% 4% 4% 10% 9% 8% 5% 4% 4% 6% 4% 4%
UK 6% 4% 7% 14% 10% 14% 16% 13% 18% 9% 7% 11% 15% 12% 17%
Total 90% 91% 90% 90% 90% 92% 90% 90% 92% 87% 89% 89% 90% 89% 90%
† l-s=low-skilled, m-s= medium-skilled, h-s= high-skilled Values larger than 10% are in bold face. Values lower than 3.85% are in italic font. The value 3.85% is 100%/26, the percentage
each country would be associated with in a completely equal distribution over all 26 EU partner countries. Only partners with at least one value over 3.85% are represented here.
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We ﬁnd that there are pronounced diﬀerences between countries
regarding domestic value added embodied in investment expenditure
and cross-border leakages to other countries. When looking at the
distribution of the intra-EU cross-border spillovers, it is clear that the
cross-border impacts are concentrated in a few countries. We also show
the cross-border impacts in terms of employment compensation, and
in terms of hours of employment. Under full employment, the impacts
on employment and the subsequent wage eﬀects will cancel out.
However, unemployment rates are just starting to recover from the
global ﬁnancial crisis of 2007/2008 and these impacts should therefore
be considered.
This paper highlights the additional information that can be
attained from performing an impact analysis through multi-regional
input-output modeling. The drawbacks of this method are related to
the assumption of ﬁxed input coeﬃcients (both the technology and the
trade coeﬃcients) and the limited role of prices. However, most
expenditure related to an investment project take place within a couple
of years, so rigidity in the input coeﬃcients can be defended.
Alternatively, one could consider expanding the analysis with the help
of spatial computable general equilibrium modeling. Computable
general equilibrium models are a class of economic models that use
actual economic data to estimate how an economy might react to
changes in policy, technology or other external factors. Another
limitation is that our study focuses on one important, and often
neglected, element of a complete investment assessment. We do not
consider the beneﬁts of the investment and the impacts due to
operation, and our results therefore do not directly support the
investment decision. Further, we did not account for market power
and uncertainty. To extend the cost-side scope, a comparable study
could be undertaken after deﬁning the yearly expenses of operation and
maintenance. However, as the bulk of gas infrastructure expenditures
are related to the initial investment, our study gives a good ﬁrst
impression of the distribution of the economic impacts of the invest-
ment. After the investment project is carried out, the operation and
maintenance costs are relatively low. Of course, these should be taken
into account when deciding upon alternative investment proposals.
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